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I. Introduction
Global governance aims to address common global concerns through the activities of
governments, intergovernmental networks and non-state actors. These actors are involved
in interactive decision-making and considerations of multiple policies and practices in the
creation of instruments to address global concerns. Such global concerns include the elimi-
nation of corruption, human rights, and environmental abuses which are external Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility (CSR) issues.
The social and ethical problems corporations encounter in the pursuit of business has
brought CSR to the forefront and placed it firmly under global governance. CSR focuses on
the attempt to regulate corporate behavior in order to ensure that corporations carry out
their activities in consideration to multi-stakeholder interests. In addition, CSR looks at the
impact that such activities may have on the social, political, economic and developmental
aspects of society. This paper will examine the impact of global governance on the elimina-
tion of corruption-especially bribery of senior public officials by corporations in the pur-
suit of contracts, human rights, and the environment.
International law plays a very important role in the effort to address CSR global con-
cerns. For example, in the area of corruption, international law has developed many in-
struments, such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC),' the Orga-
nisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Anti-Bribery Con-
vention),' and the Organization of American States Inter-American Convention against
Corruption (Inter-American Convention) 3 in order to address the issue of corruption as a
global concern. These instruments are created and implemented by states and non-state
actors. International law, which traditionally concerned states and international organiza-
tions, is evolving to include a multitude of players on the global governance landscape.
Global governance and its multitude of players are changing the scope of international law.
Global governance gives legitimacy to the many actors on the global scene who ordinarily
have no international legal personality. Global governance can therefore be seen as a
means of bypassing some of the structural problems of international law in relation to non-
state actors.
With the multitude of players on the global governance landscape interested in address-
ing CSR global concerns, there is no doubt bound to be a plethora of rules. This paper will
consider whether global governance is leading merely to a multiplicity of rules for corpo-
rate responsibility or a convergence of such rules and whether global governance is lead-
ing to improvements in CSR. It will also examine the bigger role non-state actors are play-
ing in global governance in relation to CSR. Finally, it will discuss the role global
governance plays in the regulation of international business for social responsibility.
1. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4. (Nov. 21, 2003)
[hereinafter UNCAC].
2. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,
Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Convention].
3. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 [hereinafter Inter-
American Convention].
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II. What is Global Governance?
The Commission on Global Governance sees global governance as a broad, dynamic, and
complex process of interactive decision making that is constantly evolving and responding
to changing circumstances. 4 It involves a wide range of actors and partnership building for
developing joint policies and practices on matters of common concern.s Global governance
refers to more than formal institutions and organizations through which the management
of international affairs is sustained. It extends to command and control mechanisms of so-
cial systems, including the private enterprise, and does not necessarily include legal or po-
litical authority. The possession of information and knowledge and the pressure of active
or mobilizable persons, along with the use of careful planning, good timing, clever manipu-
lation, and hard bargaining, all serve as examples of actions which foster control mechan-
isms that sustain governance without government.6
The classification of global governance is not limited to legal, political or other kinds of
authority. This makes it difficult to measure the relevance, if any, global governance may
have on common global concerns such as anti-corruption measures. This is because, under
such a view, it becomes difficult to determine what constitutes global governance and what
does not. For example, the activities of an organized group such as nongovernmental or-
ganizations (NGOs) that mobilize others to subscribe to a particular view may be classified
as global governance.
While such NGO activities should be welcomed, it is necessary to set some parameters
before classifying such activities as global governance. It is not often clear whether it is the
rules that may emanate from such activities that should be properly classified as global go-
vernance or the mere action of social systems, which may or may not lead to rules, which
should be classified as global governance. Generally, it should be the former.
Global governance calls for interdependence and cooperation. Interdependence ensures
that actions at one level create consequences at other levels. The cooperation and interde-
pendence envisaged on such a large scale in global governance necessarily means there
will be the need for compromises on how governance is achieved. In some situations, legal
regulation and enforcement will take a back seat while market forces take the front seat. In
other situations, there will be friction between opposing sides with different views on the
way to move forward. For example, NGOs and trade organizations, such as the Internation-
al Chamber of Commerce (ICC), are at loggerheads regarding the need for mandatory rules
regarding CSR. 7
Many see global governance as an amalgamation of many rules, formal and informal, or-
4. See Thomas G. Weiss, Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual
Challenges, in THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE READER 82 (Rorden Wilkinson ed., 2005)
5. See Rorden Wilkinson, The Commission on Global Governance: A New World, in THE GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE READER, supra note 4, at 26.
6. See James Rosenau, Governance in the Twenty-First Century, in THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE READER, supra
note 4, at 45.
7. For the ICC's stance on regulation of business, see What is ICC?, INTERNTIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
http://www.iccwbo.org/id93/index.html (last visited June 11, 2011). For an NGO stance, see
CHRISTIAN AID, BEHIND THE MASK, THE REAL FACE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2004), available at
http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/-csearweb/aptopractice/Behind-the-maskpdf.
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ganized and unorganized, present on the global scene wanting to control global affairs."
With such a system, it has been said that there can be no consensus or single institution
with the capacity or authority to regulate such rules. This is true to an extent. However,
there is need for consensus in global governance and for bodies or international institu-
tions to be appointed to coordinate global efforts to control global affairs. This will ensure
the effectiveness of global governance in addressing global concerns.
In the context of CSR, the need for such consensus is justifiable. The social and ethical
problems faced by multinational corporations (MNCs)-which are major vehicles of globa-
lization-have brought CSR to the forefront and placed it firmly under global governance.
Attempts at 'global' corporate responsibility have proved futile. There has been partner-
ship building on different levels to develop practices and policies relevant for CSR.9 How-
ever, it is argued that no consensus has been reached and perhaps none can be reached
under the global governance agenda. This may be because CSR is very broad, encompass-
ing many different issues. Different actors may have different agendas so the possibility of
reaching a consensus is more difficult.
It is argued that one way global governance may bring about consensus is by breaking
down CSR issues into identifiable sections.' 0 These identifiable sections would include CSR
anti-corruption, human rights, labour, and environmental concerns. By identifying specific
areas of CSR, global governance has a better chance of being effective in bringing opposing
views together, thereby impacting CSR in a tangible manner. The next section will focus on
the CSR aspect of anti-corruption, human rights, and the environment in the context of
global governance.
III. Global Governance and CSR Concerns
A. Anti-Corruption
Corruption is the misuse of entrusted power for private gain." Corruption includes bri-
bery, embezzlement, concealment and laundering of proceeds, and trading in influence. 12
Corruption can be petty or grand. Grand corruption is 'the misuse of public power by heads
of states, ministers and top officials for private, pecuniary profit.'13 Grand corruption in-
volves two main activities: bribery payments and the embezzlement and misappropriation
of state assets.' 4 This paper will focus on bribery because it raises CSR issues. Bribery is "a
widespread phenomenon in international business transactions, including trade and in-
8. See THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE READER, supra note 4.
9. See Overview, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompactorg/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2010) [hereinafter
UN GLOBAL COMPACT].
10. See breakdown infra.
11. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION HANDBOOK: NATIONAL
INTEGRITY SYSTEM IN PRACTICE (2004)
12. See UNCAC, supra note 1, arts. 13-31.
13. GEORGE MOODY-STUART, GRAND CORRUPTION IN THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 2 (1997).
14. See UNODC & THE WORLD BANK, STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY (STAR) INITIATIVE: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES,
AND ACTION (2007), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/Star-rep-full.pdf
[hereinafter STAR INITIATIVE].
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vestment, which raises serious moral and political concerns, undermines good governance
and economic development, and distorts international competitive conditions."' 5
In many situations, corruption is linked to governance or government in the sense that
bad governance or government decisions lead to corruption. Most writings on governance
and corruption address governance in relation to governments and corruption.16 Here, the
attempt is to link global governance-decision-making giving rise to a multiplicity of rules
involving multi-actors-to corruption. Specifically, the role global governance can play in
reducing corrupt activities carried out by MNCs, and the need for reformed and streng-
thened institutions-public, private and intergovernmental-to ensure effective adhe-
rence to global frameworks for the elimination of corrupt business practices.
Global governance can reduce corrupt activities carried out by MNCs through the impact
of efforts carried out by states and non-state actors on the international, regional and na-
tional sectors. As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, international instruments to
address corrupt business practices include the United Nations Convention against Corrup-
tion (UNCAC),1 7 the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and the Organization of American
States Inter-American Convention against Corruption.
The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption was adopted on 29 March 1996 in
Caracas, Venezuela and entered into force on 6 March 1997.18 The convention aims to (a)
promote and strengthen the development by each of the State Parties of the mechanisms
needed to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and (b) promote, facilitate and
regulate cooperation among the State Parties to ensure the effectiveness of measures and
actions to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption in the performance of public
functions and acts of corruption specifically related to such performance.' 9
With regards to transnational or overseas bribery, which is the offering or granting, di-
rectly or indirectly of undue pecuniary or other advantage to a foreign public official, the
Convention does not make the act an offence to which all States Parties should adopt legis-
lative or other measures to establish as a criminal offence. 20 Rather, it is only an act of cor-
ruption among States that have established it as an offence. States which have not estab-
lished transnational bribery as an offence are only required to provide assistance and
cooperation with respect to the offence. 2 1 The Convention deals with deterrence of trans-
national bribery applicable to all State Parties through preventive measures which require
the establishment of "mechanisms to ensure that publicly held companies and other types
of associations maintain books and records which, in reasonable detail, accurately reflect
the acquisition and disposition of assets, and have sufficient internal accounting controls to
enable their officers to detect corrupt acts."22
15. See OECD Convention, supra note 2.
16. See DANIEL KAUFMANN, WORLD BANK, Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption (2005),
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8089/1/MythsRealitiesCovCorruption.pdf.
17. See generally UNCAC, supra note 1.
18. See generally Inter-American Convention, supra note 3, at 724.
19. Id. at 728.
20. Id. at 730 (stating that the acts of corruption listed in Article VI are the acts requiring legislative or
other measures).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 728, 110.
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The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention was signed on 18 December 1997 and entered into
force on 15 February 1999.23 The Convention aims to end bribery in international business
transactions by requesting that State Parties take measures to establish the crime of bri-
bery of a foreign public official. 24 The Convention deals with the "active bribery" or "supply
side" of corruption, which is defined as the offering of bribes by natural or legal persons to
foreign public officials in international business transactions. 25 The Convention stipulates
that bribes of foreign public officials shall be punishable by "effective, proportionate and
dissuasive criminal penalties" but where the legal system of a party does not recognize
criminal responsibility for legal persons, non-criminal sanctions may be used.26
The UNCAC was adopted on 31 October 2003 and entered into force on 14 December
2005.27 The UNCAC aims to prevent and combat corruption efficiently and effectively on a
global scale; ensure international co-operation and technical assistance in the anti-
corruption fight; and promote integrity, accountability and proper management of public
affairs and public property. 28 The provisions of the Convention include preventive meas-
ures and criminalization and law enforcement measures. 29
The preventive measures include several anti-corruption policies and practices.30 State
Parties are required to endeavour to establish and promote effective practices aimed at the
prevention of corruption and periodically evaluate relevant legal instruments and adminis-
trative measures with a view to determining their adequacy to prevent and fight corrup-
tion.31 The Convention criminalizes the bribery of national public officials, foreign public
officials or officials of public international organization. 32 It requires State Parties to adopt
legislative and other measures to establish liability of legal persons (corporations) for par-
23. See OECD Convention, supra note 2.
24. Id. art. 1. The offences set out in Article 1, paragraph 1 and Article 1, paragraph 2 of the OECD
Convention constitute the crime of bribery of a public official.
Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence
under its law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other
advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or
for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of
official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of
international business.
Id. 1 1.
Each Party shall take any measures necessary to establish that complicity in, including incitement,
aiding and abetting, or authorisation of an act of bribery of a foreign public official shall be a
criminal offence. Attempt and conspiracy to bribe a foreign public official shall be criminal offences
to the same extent as attempt and conspiracy to bribe a public official of that Party.
Id. 2.
25. See id. arts. 4, 8-11. See also Angel Gurria, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
THE OECD FIGHTS CORRUPTION (2006), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/51/37393705.pdf.
26. See OECD Convention, supra note 2, art. 3, 11 1-2.
27. Signatories to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND
CRIME [UNODC], http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last visited Oct.
12, 2010).
28. UNCAC, supra note 1, ch. 1, art. 1.
29. Id.
30. See generally id. ch. 2, art 5.
31. ld. ch. 5, art. 3.
32. See generally id. ch. 3, art. 15.
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ticipation in any offence established with the Convention.33 Such liability may be criminal,
civil or administrative. In particular, legal persons held liable are to be subject to effective,
proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanc-
tions. 34
These instruments aim to curb corruption. The discussions above have briefly illu-
strated the impacts they have on foreign corrupt practices carried out by MNCs. However,
the creation and implementation of these instruments involve both state and non-state ac-
tors. International organizations such as the United Nations are also involved in multi-
stakeholder initiatives to address corruption and other CSR concerns. The UN Global Com-
pact, initiated by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan, aims to bring business, govern-
ment, civil society, and the United Nations into partnership to ensure that businesses are
committed to aligning their operations and strategies with ten universally accepted prin-
ciples in the area of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption. 35 Principle 10
relates to anti-corruption. Businesses are required to work against all forms of corruption
including extortion and bribery; businesses should also develop policies and programmes
to address corruption. 36
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), another inter-
national organization, has developed voluntary guidelines to promote responsible business
conduct.3 7 These guidelines address a number of CSR issues including human rights, la-
bour, environment and bribery. With regards to anti-corruption, businesses are required
to: refrain from offering, promising, giving or demanding bribes to retain business or other
undue advantage; reject solicitation of bribes; not use subcontracts, purchase orders or
consulting agreements for channeling payments to public officials; ensure appropriate and
legitimate remuneration of agents; and adopt management control systems, financial and
tax accounting and auditing practices preventing secret or "off the book" accounts.38
Moreover, non-state actors have also established soft law mechanisms to address for-
eign corrupt practices. Such actors include Transparency International (TI), a well-known
NGO at the forefront of anti-corruption measures.3 9 For example, TI and the Social Accoun-
tability International facilitated and developed the TI Business Principles in 2002.40 Private
sector companies, other NGOs and trade unions were very useful and active in the devel-
opment of the TI principles. The TI principles aim to provide practical guidance for coun-
tering bribery, creating a level playing field and providing a long-term business advan-
33. Id. ch. 2, art. 25
34. Id. ch. 3, art. 26.
35. Seegenerally UN GLOBAL COMPACT, supra note 9.
36. See Ten Principles, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompactorg/aboutthegc/thetenprinciples/index.html (last visited Oct. 12,
2010) [hereinafter Ten Principles].
37. See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD], OECD GUIDELINES
FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2008), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf
[hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
38. Id. ch. VI.
39. About Transparency International: What is Transparency International?, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.transparency.org/about-us (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
40. See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, BUSINESS PRINCIPLES FOR COUNTERING BRIBERY: AN ESSENTIAL TOOL FOR
BUSINESS (2003), available at http://www.bcch.com/content/TIBusinessPrinciples.pdf.
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tage.41 The TI principles call for companies to have a zero tolerance for bribery and com-
mitment to implementation of an anti-bribery programme.42 TI has also published a guid-
ance document to help companies implement or review their anti-bribery pro-
grammes/practices. 43
Another example of non-state actor activity in curbing foreign corruption is the Partner-
ing Against Corruption Initiative (PACI) launched by World Economic Forum (WEF) in
partnership with TI and the Basel Institute on Governance.44 The WEF believes MNCs have
a particularly important role to play in upholding and advancing principles on human
rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption. 45 The aim of PACI was to rally business
leaders, governments, civil servants and legislators behind the fight against corruption, 46
as well as consolidate private sector efforts to fight bribery and corruption and shape the
evolving regulatory framework.47 The PACI Principles are based on TI Business Principles
and, like the TI Business Principles, they call for a commitment to a zero tolerance policy
towards bribery and development of a practical and effective implementation programme
by companies. 48
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is another non-state actor involved in
curbing corruption.49 The ICC established the ICC Rules of Conduct and Recommendations
for Combating Extortion and Bribery.50 The Rules call for enterprises to prohibit bribery
and extortion at all times and in any form; make sure agents and other intermediaries are
compliant with policy and payments to agents are legitimate and appropriate; ensure that
joint venture partners accept the company's anti-bribery provisions; implement corporate
policies or codes; and ensure proper financial recording and auditing.s' The ICC has pub-
lished a corporate practices manual which aims to provide detailed practical guidance for
41. Business Principles for Countering US Bribery: Guidance Document, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.transparency.org/global-priorities/private-sector/business-principles/guidance-docum
ent (last visited Oct 12, 2010).
42. Id.
43. See generally TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.transparency.org (last visited Oct 12, 2010).
44. See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, PARTNERING AGAINST CORRUPTION-PRINCIPLES FOR COUNTERING BRIBERY
(2005), http://www.weforum.org/pdf/paci/PACI-Principles.pdf.
45. See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, PARTNERING TO STRENGTHEN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE: THE LEADERSHIP
CHALLENGE FOR CEOS AND BOARDS (2008),
http://www.weforum.org/documents/PR/GCCIReport_20080111.pdf.
46. See Business Principles for Countering Bribery, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.transparency.org/global-priorities/private-sector/business-principles (last visited June
11,2011).
47. See Initiatives: What is the Role of Business in Advancing Economic and Development and Social
Progress?, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/index.htm (last visited
Oct 12, 2010).
48. See Partnering Against Corruption: Partnering Against Corruption Initiative, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM,
http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/paci/index.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
49. Anti-Corruption Commission: Policy and Business Practices, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE [ICC],
http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/anticorruption/ (last visited Oct 12, 2010).
50. See ICC, COMMISSION ON ANTI-CORRUPTION, COMBATING EXTORTION AND BRIBERY: ICC RULES OF CONDUCT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS arts. 1-3, 7-9 (2005), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/anticorruption/Statements/ICCRules-ofConduc
tandRecommendations%20_2005%20Revision.pdf.
51. Id
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compliance with the ICC rules and OECD Convention. 52
The activities of all these state and non-state actors are examples of the roles global go-
vernance plays in reducing corrupt activities carried out by MNCs. The activities of these
actors and the impact these activities have on changing CSR attitudes have been pivotal.
Arguably, some activities are more effective than others. For example, the use of corporate
liability to hold corporations accountable for foreign bribery, as can be seen through the
several prosecutions that have taken place under the application of the U.S. Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act (FCPA), 53 may be more effective than calling for companies to have zero
tolerance to bribery with no effective mechanisms to ensure corporations comply. Never-
theless, all the activities at least create awareness that corruption operates on the global
scene and aims to address CSR issues such as curbing of foreign corruption.
There is a need for reform and strengthening of institutions to address foreign corrup-
tion. In relation to asset recovery which is concerned with public officials who stash stolen
assets in the financial centers of developed countries, it is important to note that such as-
sets are comprised of foreign bribes from MNCs originating in developing countries. 5 4 The
launch of the Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) initiative by the World Bank and United Nations
office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to help developing countries recover stolen assets is
therefore welcome. It is also a good example of how global governance can impact corrup-
tion positively.
The StAR initiative calls for the ratification by all countries of the UNCAC and makes es-
sential the collective effort of multilateral and bilateral agencies, civil society and the pri-
vate sector.ss The initiative will help member states who have signed the UNCAC streng-
then their capacity to implement chapter V on Asset Recovery.5 6 Although the UNCAC
chapter on asset recovery is not directed at MNCs, asset recovery which curtails the use of
financial centres in developing countries to store stolen assets indirectly impacts MNCs.
This can be seen especially where in the process of tracing the assets, MNCs are impli-
cated as the providers of these stolen assets. For example, in the Singapore case of Sumito-
mo Bank, Ltd. v. Thahir,57 which involved the tracing of assets related to bribes, two Ger-
man contractors, namely Klockner Industrie Analgen and Siemens A.G., paid bribes to a
senior employee (General Thahir) of Pertamina, an Indonesian state corporation entrusted
with the task of developing a number of projects vital for Indonesia. The bribes had been
given in order for the companies to obtain better contractual terms and preferential treat-
ment where payments were concerned. General Thahir had deposited the proceeds into
52. See ICC, FIGHTING CORRUPTION: A CORPORATE PRACTICES MANUAL (Francois Vincke & Fritz Heimann eds.,
2003).
53. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006).
54. See STAR INITIATIVE, supra note 14.
55. See Press Release, UNODC, World Bank and UNODC to Pursue Stolen Asset Recovery (Sept. 17, 2007),
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/world-bank-and-unodc-to-pursue-stolen-asset-
recovery.html.
56. See Press Release, The World Bank, joint Announcement-The President of the Republic of Indonesia
and the President of the World Bank on Indonesia-World Bank Cooperation (Sept. 25, 2007),
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/INDONESIAEX
TN/0,,contentMDK:21486611-menuPK:224605-pagePK:2865066-piPK:2865079-theSitePK:2263
09,00.html.
57. [1993] 1 SLR 735 (Sing.)
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nineteen Asian Currency Units accounts in Sumitomo Bank Singapore. Seventeen accounts
were denominated in Deutschmarks and totaled DM 53 million while two accounts were
denominated in US Dollars and contained $593,249.31 and $608,959.42, respectively. Fol-
lowing the death of General Thahir, three different parties, namely his wife, his estate and
Pertamina, claimed entitlements to the proceeds of his account. The court held the seven-
teen accounts denominated in Deutschmarks were bribes paid by Siemens and Klockner to
Thahir.58
Therefore, asset tracing claims which implicate MNCs will have a negative impact on the
reputation of such MNCs. There is evidence to suggest that such negative impacts are not in
the best interest of MNCs.59 This is more so in light of the recent global climate against for-
eign bribery. MNCs do not want to be associated with bribes. Indeed, Siemens, which was
implicated in the 1993 Sumitomo Bank case, has in recent times had its own fair share of
corruption scandals. Siemens has been prosecuted, in both Germany and the U.S., for the
illegal conduct of giving bribes to win overseas contracts over a period of time spanning
2001-2007. According to one newspaper report, "[t]he scandal has cost Siemens, a sym-
bol of German engineering excellence and corporate probity, not only its reputation and
that of former senior executives but more than C1.6 billion in costs."60 In 2007 Siemens
agreed to pay a fine of E201 million and then 4395 million in 2008 to settle the case in
Munich courts. 6 1 In 2008, Siemens agreed to pay the U.S. Department of Justice $450 mil-
lion to settle charges of bribery and trying to falsifying corporate books. 62 The U.S. Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission also received $350 million on similar charges under the
FCPA. 63 The cost of the case to Siemens totals C2.5 billion.64
The UNODC also has a number of publications on corruption. These include the Global
Action Against Corruption: The Merida Papers, and the Compendium of International Legal
Instruments on Corruption.6s The Merida papers were compiled from a side event during
the signing of the UNCAC in 2003. The event had four panels; Panel One was on Preventive
Measures against Corruption: the Role of Private and Public Sectors; Panel Two was on The
Role of Civil Society and the Media in Building a Culture against Corruption; Panel Three
was on Legislative Measures to Implement the UNCAC; and Panel Four was on Measures to
58. Id. at 737.
59. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006).
60. David Gow, Record Fine Ends Siemens Bribery Scandal, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 16, 2008, at 24, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/dec/16/regulation-siemens-scandal-bribery.
61. Id.
62. Press Release, Department of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Pleas Guilty to Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15,
2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html.
63. See Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in
Worldwide Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm.
64. Gow, supra note 60; see also Siemens Told to Tread Carefully by Transparency International, DEUTSCHE
WELLE (July 12, 2006), http://dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,2263565,00.html (last visited June 11,
2011) (providing an additional report on the Siemens scandal); see also Sir Schubert & T. Christian
Miller, At Siemens, Bribery Was just a Line Item, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2008,
http://nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21siemens.html (offering a supporting
report on the Siemens scandal).
65. See generally Publications on Corruption, UNODC,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/publications.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2010)
(providing access to four reports on corruption).
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Combat Corruption in National and International Financial Systems, respectively. 66 The
panels agreed that a comprehensive and integrated anti-corruption strategy targeting the
political, social and economic domains was needed in the fight against corruption. Supreme
audit institutions, public prosecution, police, financial oversight institutions, public admin-
istration, private sector and civil society all had a part to play in a successful anti-
corruption strategy. The panels emphasized the importance of the role of civil society and
the media.67
Arguably, the World Bank, a specialized agency involved with economics and global
trade, can play a pivotal role in assisting with efforts to curb corruption. Indeed, its work
with the UNODC suggests it is already playing that role. In 1997, the World Bank developed
an anti-corruption strategy focusing on prevention of fraud and corruption in bank
projects; mainstreaming corruption concerns and lending active support to international
efforts to address corruption. 68 The StAR initiative, as previously discussed, is an integral
part of the anti-corruption strategy. 69 To accomplish these strategies, the World Bank lends
active support to international efforts through sponsorships of major conferences and
support for adoption of international conventions. 70 The World Bank has procurement
guidelines in place and carries out intensive audits of projects.71 The World Bank has more
than 330 firms and individuals debarred from carrying out World Bank projects, for pe-
riods lasting a year to permanent debarments.72
B. Human Rights
MNCs are involved in rights violations in countries where they carry out their business
activities. Such rights violations include right to life, economic, social and cultural rights.
For example, MNCs have been complicit through partnership with repressive governments
in the extractive industry in developing countries. Examples include Shell in Nigeria, where
there were allegations of environmental degradation, health problems, and murder;73 and
Unocal in Burma, where there was complicity with the military government in human
rights crimes against humanity, forced labor, torture, loss of home and property.74 These
66. See UNODC, GLOBAL ACTION AGAINST CORRUPTION: THE MERIDAS PAPERS (2004),
http://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/publications-merida-e.pdf.
67. See generally id. at 45.
68. See World bank, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: PROGRESS AT THE WORLD BANK SINCE 1997
(2000), http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/01/20/000094946_0101
0905322182/Rendered/PDF/multi-page.pdf.
69. See generally STAR INITIATIVE, supra note 14.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. See FAQS-Fraud & Corruption, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2010)
(follow "About" hyperlink; then follow "FAQs" hyperlink; then follow "Fraud & Corruption"
hyperlink).
73. See Communication No. 155/96 (2001), The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre for Economic
and Social Rights v. Nigeria, African Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights [hereinafter ACHPR],
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/155-96.html); Adefolake Adeyeye,
Corporate Responsibility in International Law: Which Way to Go?, 11 SING. Y.B. INT'L L. 141, 144-45
(2007) (discussing the communication and litigation in US courts).
74. See EARTHRIGHTS INTERNATIONAL, IN OUR COURT: ATCA, SOSA AND THE TRIUMPH OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2004),
http://www.earthrights.org/sites/default/files/publications/in-our-court.pdf.
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complicities led to litigation under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act, which allows U.S district
courts to hear civil claims of foreigners for injuries caused by actions in violations of the
law of nations or a treaty of the U.S. 75 The litigation was brought by NGOs such as Earth-
Rights International and Centre for Constitutional Rights. The cases eventually settled out
of court. They illustrate the litigation and reputational risks companies face if they do not
conform to human rights practices.
These allegations and implications also led to calls for tighter direct corporate responsi-
bility in international law. An attempt at such direct responsibility was the 2003 Draft
Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises
with Respect to Human Rights ("Draft Norms"). 76 The Draft Norms, considered by the Unit-
ed Nations Charter, aimed to promote universal respect for and observance of human
rights and fundamental freedoms. It aimed to produce standards applicable to all corpora-
tions in areas of human rights, labor, environment, and anti-corruption and hold corpora-
tions directly responsible for human rights norms. However, critics were quick to point out
that the norms went beyond current international law's obligatory requirements of state
responsibility.7 7 Traditionally under human rights, states were responsible for ensuring
third parties such as MNCs do not violate human rights. Corporations could not be held di-
rectly responsible under international law. This was in effect because corporations lacked
legal personality under international law.
Current events have eroded the relevance of the Draft Norms. John Ruggie, the U.N. Spe-
cial Representative, was appointed to deal with the impasse from the Draft Norms. He con-
cluded that the Draft Norms exaggerated legal claims and conceptual ambiguities.78 In
areas other than those involving international crimes, legal responsibility is greatly debat-
able, but there is potential for the use of soft law standards and initiatives in the future de-
velopment of corporate responsibility.79 Ruggie also proposed a framework in which he
stated that the state has a duty to protect human rights while corporations have a duty to
respect human rights.80 For companies to effectively discharge their duty to respect, they
need to carry out due diligence which should include policies, impact assessments and in-
tegration and tracking performance.8 1
75. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000); Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D.
Cal. 1997), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd
on reh'g (en banc), 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); Adeyeye, supra note 73, at 151-52.
76. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Subcomm'n on Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/0/64155e7e8141b38ccl256d63002c55e8?OpenDo
cument [hereinafter Draft Norms].
77. See C.M Vasquez, Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations Under International Law (2005) 43
COLUM J. TRANSNAT'L L. 927, 929 (2005).
78. See U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Interim Rep. of the Special Rep. of the
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, 1I 57-79, delivered to the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb.
22, 2006) (by John Ruggie), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/business/RuggieReport2006.html.
79. Id. 36.
80. Id. 7 1.
81. See U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework
for Business and Human Rights: Rep. of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue
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Apart from the work of John Ruggie, which was requested by the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights (which has had a great impact on the debate about the relationship between
human rights and business) governments and civil society have also greatly impacted cor-
porate responsibility for human rights abuses. A useful resource for research on human
rights and business is the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre.82 Many codes,
guidelines, standards and initiatives have been developed to guide corporations against
human rights abuses. These include the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
("Voluntary Principles").83 The Voluntary Principles were developed in 2000 to address
human rights and security issues that involved business in countries with an extractive in-
dustry.84 The United Kingdom and United States governments brought together leading
companies such as Freeport McMoran, Shell, BP, Rio Tinto, Chevron, and Texaco and NGOS
such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Alert, International
Business Leaders Forum, and Business for Social Responsibility to deliberate on setting up
guidelines.85 The Voluntary Principles address three key areas: risk assessment in security
arrangements, state security relations, and private security force relations.86
Currently, the participants for the Voluntary Principles include the governments of
United Kingdom, United States, Norway, Netherlands, Canada, Colombia, and Switzerland.8 7
Companies participating are those involved in the energy and extractive industry such as
Anglo American, BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Freeport McMoran, Rio Tinto, Shell, and Sta-
toil.8 8 Many NGOs, including some of those involved in the development of the Voluntary
Principles, are also involved in them. In an overview of company effort to implement the
Voluntary Principles, there have been calls for home governments and NGOs to be more
involved and lend greater support and commitment to the implementation effort, especial-
ly in the area of host government engagement.89 Companies have also requested tools and
implementation guidelines to help them implement the Voluntary Principles, yet there is
still a need for independent verification.90
For an insight into civil society participation in the Voluntary Principles, Amnesty Inter-
national has advocated for a more credible process. It has called for the establishment of a
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, delivered to the
Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John Ruggie), available at
http://www.unglobalcompactorg/docs/issuesdoc/human-rights/Human-RightsWorkingGroup/2
9Apr08_7_ReportofSRSGtoHRC.pdf.
82. Id.
83. United States Global Compact, Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights: Statement by the
Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom (Dec. 19, 2000),
http://www.unglobalcompactorg/issues/conflict.prevention/meetings-and-workshops/volsupport.
html.
84. Id.
85. See Timeline, The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, VOLUNTARYPRINCIPLES.ORG,
http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/timeline/index.php#2000 (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
86. See id.
87. See Participants, The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, VOLUNTARYPRINCIPLES.ORG,
http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/participants/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
88. See id.
89. See VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, OVERVIEW OF COMPANY EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT
THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES, http://voluntaryprinciples.org/files/vp-company-efforts.pdf.
90. See id.
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reliable reporting mechanism.9 ' In 2005, Amnesty International published a report, Nige-
ria: Ten Years On: Injustice and Violence Haunt the Oil Delta.92 The report raised questions
regarding the efficacy of the Voluntary Principles in light of human rights abuses by the se-
curity forces of Chevron and Shell, members of the Voluntary Principles, in the Niger Delta
in Nigeria.9 3
As mentioned under the discussions on anti-corruption above, the Global Compact ad-
dresses human rights issues.94 Principles 1 and 2 require businesses to support and re-
spect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights and to not be complicit in
human rights abuses.9 5 The Global Compact and the Office of High Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights have done tremendous work on the issue of business and human rights. For
example, they have provided guidance to the global compact human rights principles (and
its relations to concepts such as sphere of influence and complicity), good management
practices on human rights, reporting on human rights performance, and human rights im-
pact assessments. 96 The Global Compact also has a requirement for companies that join the
initiative to report on their progress in upholding the principles of the Global Compact.9 7
The aim is to ensure greater corporate accountability and transparency to multi-
stakeholders.9 8 Companies which fail to communicate their progress may have their status
changed and eventually be delisted and removed from the Global Compact website.99 The
Global Compact website reports that as of March 2009, over 1000 companies have been
delisted. 00 Since the Global Compact was launched in 2000, more than 5200 companies in
130 countries have subscribed to the principles.101 This means that each of these compa-
nies would be required to submit a communication on their reports. The communication
on progress therefore raises issues about the monitoring and measuring of corporate per-
formance. The Global Compact has made it clear that it is not designed to monitor or meas-
ure corporate performance,102 hence suggesting the bulk of the work of performance moni-
toring should be done by civil society, the media, and the companies themselves.
91. See Business and Human Rights, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.amnesty.ca/themes/business-processes.php (last visited June 11, 2011).
92. Amnesty International, Nigeria: Ten Years on: Injustice and Violence Haunt the Oil Delta, Al Index AFR
44/022/2005 (Nov. 3, 2005).
93. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/files/voluntary-principles-english.pdf.
94. See generally UN GLOBAL COMPACT, supra note 9.
95. See Ten Principles, supra note 36.
96. See UN GLOBAL COMPACT, SOME KEY BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS GUIDANCE MATERIALS AND How TO USE
THEM (2010),
http://www.unglobalcompactorg/docs/issues-doc/human-rights/Resources/Some-key-business_a
nd humanjrightsguidancematerials-and-howto use them.pdf.
97. See UN GLOBAL COMPACT, supro note 9.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Communication Progress: Overview, UN GLOBAL COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompactorg/COP/index.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
101. See Participants, UN GLOBAL COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html (last visited Oct. 18,
2010).
102. See Integrity Measures, UN GLOBAL COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompactorg/AboutTheGC/IntegrityMeasures/index.html (last visited Oct 12,
2010).
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Nevertheless, it is commendable that the Global Compact at least provides a means where-
by company reporting can be scrutinized by stakeholders if so desired.
Also mentioned in discussions on anti-corruption were the OECD Guidelines for Multi-
national Enterprises.103 The guidelines call for businesses to respect the human rights of
those affected by their activities consistent with the host government's international obli-
gations and commitments.104 Implementation of the guidelines is vested in National Con-
tact Points (NCPs), which are government offices responsible for encouraging the obser-
vance of the guidelines and creating awareness of the guidelines within national business
communities.105 There have been questions as to the overall effectiveness of the guide-
lines. 106 In June 2009, at the OECD ministerial meeting, further consultation on updating
the guidelines to enhance their relevance and clarify the responsibilities of the private sec-
tor was welcomed. 0 7 Issues which have been identified as necessary to be included in this
update include reinforcement of the human rights components of the guidelines, NCP pro-
cedure for specific instance facility, and NCP performance. 08 The OECD notes that it will
require the expertise of business, labour and civil society in the consultation process. 0 9
C. Environment
The lists of environmental issues corporations can be implicated in are non-exhaustive.
They include climate change, pollution and environmental degradation. A case which illu-
strates the impact of corporations on the environment is the 1984 Bhophal Gas Plant Tra-
gedy which, according to official records, killed 3000 and disabled 50,000; up to 15,000
more subsequently died from exposure to the poisonous gas.110 The plant was operated by
Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL), which was fifty-percent owned by Union Carbide Cor-
poration. The tragedy was a result of a poisonous gas, which leaked from the factory into
the surrounding environs."' The tragedy led to litigation in the U.S.; the U.S. courts dis-
missed the case in favour of litigation in India. The Indian case was settled out of court for
$470 million.112 It is important to note that there is still an ongoing case in the U.S. courts
with regards to property damage brought about as a result of the Bhophal incident.'
The plaintiffs in that case claimed that for a period of twenty years (1972-1992) Tex-
aco released massive quantities of toxic waste into waters, thus contaminating the wa-
103. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 37.
104. Id.
105. See id. Part II.
106. See OECD WATCH, OECD WATCH 2008 REVIEW OF NATIONAL CONTACT POINTS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE OECD GUIDELINES (2008), http://oecdwatch.org/publications-
en/Publication 2812/at-download/fullfile.
107 See OECD, 2009 EU CONFERENCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, ACCESS TO REMEDIES AND THE OECD
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, (2009)
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/24/44037912.pdf.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 4.
110. Case Profile: Union Carbide/Dow Lawsuit (re Bhopal), BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE,
http://www.businesshumanrights.org/Categories/Lawlawsuits/Lawsuitsregulatoryaction/Lawsuits
Selectedcases/UnionCarbideDowlawsuitreBhopal (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
111. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 1987).
112. Chronology, BHOPHAL, http://www.bhopal.com/chrono.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
113. See Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2001).
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ter.114 The district court dismissed the case for forum non conveniens and held the case
should be heard in Ecuador."1 s The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
this decision."1 6 The case is ongoing in Ecuador. 117 These cases and many others illustrate
the need for corporate responsibility for environmental concerns.
An attempt to promote such corporate responsibility can be seen in the adoption of
Agenda 21 during the Earth Summit, or the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.118 Agenda 21 is a comprehensive
programme or global action in all areas of sustainable development. 119 Agenda 21 is espe-
cially useful for corporations as it recommends ways to strengthen the role of major
groups including business, industry, and NGOs in achieving sustainable development.120
Chapter 30 of Agenda 21 calls on business and industry to: participate in the implementa-
tion and evaluation of activities related to Agenda 21;121 reduce impact on resource use
and the environment; 122 and make environmental management the highest corporate
priority and a key determinant to sustainable development. 123
Agenda 21 proposed two programme areas for companies: the promotion on cleaner
production and responsible entrepreneurship.124 Accordingly, in order to promote cleaner
production, companies were required to increase efficiency of resource utilization, includ-
ing increasing the reuse and recycling of residues, and reducing the quantity of waste dis-
charge per unit of economic output.125 Furthermore, companies are encouraged to report
annually on environmental records, use of energy and natural resources; and adopt and
report on implementation of codes of conduct promoting best environmental practice.126
For responsible entrepreneurship, companies are advised to encourage the concept of ste-
wardship in management and utilization of natural resources; 127 increase the number of
entrepreneurs engaged in implementation of sustainable development policies; 128 and es-
tablish worldwide corporate policies on sustainable development. 129
114. Brief for EarthRights International as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157
F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998), Aguinda v. Texaco, 303 F. 3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002), available at
http://www.earthrights.org/publication/amicus-brief-jota-v-texaco-and-aguida-v-texaco
[hereinafter Amicus Brief]; see also Case Profile: Texaco/Chevron Lawsuits (re Ecuador), BUSINESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE,
http://www.businesshumanrights.org/Categories/Lawlawsuits/Lawsuitsregulatoryaction/Lawsuits
Selectedcases/TexacoChevronlawsuitsreEcuador (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
115. Aguinda v. Texaco, 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
116. Id.
117. See Amicus Brief, supra note 114.
118. See AGENDA 21: EARTH SUMMIT-UNITED NATIONS PROGRAM OF ACTION FROM RIO, at Introduction, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.151/26, UN Sales No. E.93.1.11 (1992), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/ [hereinafter AGENDA 21].
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. ch. 30.1.
122. Id. ch. 30.2.
123. Id. ch. 30.3.
124. Id.
125. Id. ch. 30.6.
126. Id. ch. 30.10.
127. Id.
128. Id. ch. 30.18.
129. Id. ch. 30.22.
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Businesses responded to these calls through the adoption of soft law initiatives devel-
oped by governments, international organizations, and NGOs. These include the ICC Busi-
ness Charter for Sustainable Development ("Charter"), Responsible Care Initiative, the Coali-
tion for Environmentally Responsible Economies' Ceres Principles, the Global Compact and
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.130 The Charter was developed in 1991.131 It
is a voluntary business initiative for environmental management. 132 There are sixteen
principles involving issues such as corporate priority and compliance and monitoring.133
Principle 1 calls for the recognition that environmental management should be among the
highest corporate priorities and is a key determinant of sustainable development.134 The
website for the Charter acknowledges that many companies now implement environmen-
tal management systems which go much further than the basic elements of the Charter. It
cites the UN Global Compact as playing a leading role.135
The Responsible Care Initiative arose as a result of environmental issues faced by chemi-
cal companies such as Bhopal.13 6 Responsible Care is the chemical industry's environmen-
tal, health and safety initiative to drive continuous improvement in performance in the
chemical industry. 137 It calls for companies "to use resources efficiently and minimise
waste"; "report openly on performance, achievements and shortcomings"; engage in stake-
holder dialogues and engagements; "cooperate with governments and organisations in the
development and implementation of effective regulations and standards"; and "foster the
responsible management of chemicals."138 There are criticisms that the Responsible Care
Global Charter is "a public relations effort to polish the image of' the chemical industry.1 3 9
The criticism goes on that principles "are not higher standards for the chemical industry
that can be objectively and openly verified by the public, independent scientists or gov-
ernment regulators."140 The charter itself notes that Responsible Care will "continue to un-
dertake actions consistent with the environmental principles of the United Nations Global
Compact."141
The Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (Ceres) is a national network
130. Id. ch. 40.
131. About the Business Charter for Sustainable Development, ICC COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY,
http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/environment/idl307/index.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2010)
132. Id.
133. Business Charter for Sustainable Development-16 Principles, ICC COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND
ENERGY, http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/environment/idl309/index.htm (last visited Oct. 12,
2010).)
134. See id.
135. Business Charter Frequently Asked Questions, ICC COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY,
http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/environment/idl308/index.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
136. See Environmental Working Group, Responsible? Care?: As bad news mounts and polls head south,
chemical companies spend millions on 'public perception,' CHEMICAL INDUSTRY ARCHIVES, Mar. 27, 2009,
http://www.chemicalindustryarchives.com/dirtysecrets/responsiblecare/1.asp [hereinafter
Reasonable? Care?]; see also Bhopal Information Center, Statement of Union Carbide Corporation
Regarding the Bhopal Tragedy, http://www.bhopal.com/pdfs/ucs.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
137. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHEMICAL ASSoCATIONS, RESPONSIBLE CARE GLOBAL CHARTER (2005),
http://www.icca-chem.org/ICCADocs/09_RCGCENFeb2006.pdf.
138. Id.
139. Environmental Working Group, Responsible Care: 'Guiding Principles, CHEMICAL INDUSTRY ARCHIVES
(Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.chemicalindustryarchives.com/dirtysecrets/responsiblecare/2.asp.
140. Reasonable? Care?, supra note 136.
141. Id.
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of investment funds, environmental organisations, other public interest groups, and com-
panies working to find solutions for complex environmental and social challenges.1 42 Ceres
developed the Global Reporting Initiative, which is used by companies for corporate re-
porting on environmental, social and economic performance.143 The Ceres principles were
designed to help companies conduct business as responsible stewards of the environment.
The principles include "sustainable use of natural resources, reduction and disposal of
wastes, risk reduction, audits and reports."144
The United Nations Global Compact Principles 7-9 relate to environmental matters. 145
Companies are required to "support a precautionary approach to environmental chal-
lenges"; "undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility"; and "en-
courage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies."146 The
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) is the core U.N. agency that works closely
with partners in business, labour, and NGOs to promote "new approaches in sustainability
management and supply chain management" and improve "understanding of key corpo-
rate responsibility issues on the sustainable development agenda," amongst other con-
cerns.147
The OECD Guidelines also require companies to contribute to economic, social and envi-
ronmental progress to achieve sustainable development, and "develop and apply effective
self-regulatory practices and management systems."148 In the chapter on the environment,
companies are required to take account of environmental protection and sustainable de-
velopment within the framework of relevant national laws, regulations and administrative
practices and international agreements, principles, objectives and standards.149
IV. Overall Goals of Global Governance
An important issue which should be considered in discussions on global governance and
CSR is the determination of the overall goal of global governance. Does global governance
aim "to bring a measure of coherence to the multitude of jurisdictions proliferating" on the
global scene or does it aim to simply create a proliferation of frameworks with no cohe-
rence or agreement? 5 0 To put it another way, the tendency of global governance is to pro-
duce a multiplicity of frameworks. Should it aim to produce agreed global frameworks?
In the area of CSR, global governance has created a "vast number of rule systems" in an
interdependent world.' 5' It is argued that global governance needs to focus on ensuring
that frameworks are agreed upon, coherent and effective, rather than simply on the
142. Ceres Principles, CERES, http://www.ceres.org/Page.aspx?pid=416 (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
143. Id.
144. See id, See also Fast Forward: Ceres Annual Report 2008-2009, CERES,
http://www.ceres.org//Page.aspx?pid=813 (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
145. See Ten Principles, supra note 36.
146. Id.
147. Business & Partnership, U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME,
http://www.unep.fr/en/branches/partnerships.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
148. OECD Guidelines, supra note 37, at 14.
149. See id. at 19-20.
150. Rosenau, supra note 6, at 18.
151. Id. at 17.
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process of creating more frameworks.152 This would involve an examination of the actors
on the global scene contributing to rules affecting global affairs. Accordingly, there may be
the need to streamline the relevant actors on the global scene. Clearly, governments and
international organizations automatically qualify. Governments qualify because they are
the peoples' chosen mandate to affect global change. International organizations qualify
because they have authority or legitimacy for decision making in global affairs. The activi-
ties of NGOs and civil society may need to be scrutinized more carefully. The authority and
legitimacy of NGOs must be considered. However, the problem such a proposition faces is
the growing perception that global governance should consist of all the rules, formal and
informal, which affect management of common affairs.
While it cannot be disputed that NGOs are a substantial and active part of global gover-
nance as generally understood, the need to streamline their concerns in reaching agreed
goals may be necessary. The common criticism is that they have their own agenda. Howev-
er, it is important to stress that their activities must not be undermined. Their roles should
increasingly be considered and factored into attempts by intergovernmental institutions
and national governments to reach global governance in the sense of agreed global frame-
works which are workable and produce positive results.
It may be said that there will always be a conflict between the role of global governance
to produce agreed frameworks and the role of global governance to create multiple
frameworks which need not necessarily be agreed on. If global governance is seen in the
light of multiple frameworks with no need for coherence, it would be difficult to determine
the effect of global governance on CSR. Alternatively, it may be that global governance in
the real sense of the word may not be able to address CSR in any measurable way, but ra-
ther contributes to CSR in a haphazard way.
Global governance is best seen as governance that includes both formal and informal
rules aiming for consensus. Global governance takes away the need to address issues in in-
ternational law such as international legal personality, but should still aim to reach con-
sensus. A principle of global governance is that it legitimizes the rights of non-state actors
to participate on the global scene. In other words, it removes the pitfalls that, international
lawyers often argue, prevent non-state actors from participating in global affairs. It brings
an informal air to global affairs. Nevertheless, for such informality to be effective there
needs to be consensus. The main writers in global governance are in the field of political
science. They dismiss the need for global consensus in global governance. 53 It is argued
that attempts to improve CSR via the avenue of global governance calls for agreed consen-
sus.
The emergence of a concerted effort towards the elimination of corruption, human
rights and environmental abuses by a multitude of players has produced a clear consensus
that CSR is needed. The next step is to ensure that wrong corporate practice is discouraged
by effective deterrence mechanisms. Both the emergence of consensus and the need for ef-
fective deterrence are examples of global governance at work.
152. See THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE READER, supra note 4.
153. Id
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V. Conclusion
This paper examined the activities of states, international organizations and non-state
actors in addressing CSR concerns. Global governance is relevant for CSR because it is a
means whereby corporate misbehaviours are addressed on a global scale by multiple ac-
tors. The activities of these actors are leading to a multiplicity of policies and practices for
addressing CSR concerns. Yet, for global governance to be effective in the CSR agenda,
there needs to be consensus and co-ordination of efforts. This paper argued for the need to
break CSR into specific sections in order to bring opposing views together and be success-
ful in attempts at consensus. In the area of corruption, the paper showed that UNODC is at
the forefront of reforming, strengthening and coordinating efforts to curb corruption. In
the area of human rights, the Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights in conjunction
with the Global Compact Initiative is at the forefront of reform and co-ordination, while in
the area of environment, the United Nations Environmental Programme is at the forefront.
These efforts are in line with the Commission on Global Governance, which believes the
United Nations must continue to play a central role in global governance. 154
The paper also discussed the bigger roles non-state actors are playing in impacting CSR.
It discussed a number of initiatives, policies and practices developed by non-state actors or
in partnership with them. Many states, the U.N. and international organizations have come
to realize the importance of these actors in reaching consensus and ensuring effective ad-
herence to rules and promoting goals. There is also a realization that the issues of global
concern facing the world cannot be solved by one entity. Rather, there is the need for part-
nership on different levels. There is also the need to scrutinize the non-state actors to en-
sure their authority and legitimacy to partake in global governance is unquestionable. Non-
state actors such as civil society need to be accountable and responsible, working in the
best interest of society, not merely advancing their own agendas.
154. See Wilkinson, supra note 5.
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